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How do neighbors influence investment in social capital? : 
Homeownership and length of residence.  
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses individual data from Japan to explore how the 
circumstances of where a person resides is related to the degree of their 
investment in social capital. Controlling for unobserved area-specific fixed effects 
and various individual characteristics, I found; (1) Not only that homeownership 
and length of residence are positively related to  investment in social capital, but 
also that rates of homeowners and long-time residents in a locality increase in an 
individual‟s investments in social capital. (2) The effects of local neighborhood 
homeownership and local length of residence are distinctly larger than that of an 
individual‟s.  
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JEL classification: D71, R11, R23. 
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Introduction 
It is increasingly acknowledged that social capital plays a critical role in human 
behavior, thereby influencing economic outcomes (e.g., Putnam 1993, 2000; 
Fukuyama 1995)1. Researchers in the field of regional studies have recently 
drawn attention to the issue of social capital (e.g., Glaeser and Redlick 2008; 
Kilkenny 2006; Westlund 2007). Based on standard economic theory, social 
capital formation can be analyzed using an investment model where the amount 
of social capital depends on an individual‟s decision regarding investment 
(Glaeser et al. 2002). By considering the spatial dimension, empirical works have 
attempted to investigate how social capital is accumulated based on individual 
decision making; suggesting homeowners are more likely to invest in social 
capital as a result of their lower mobility rates (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; 
Hilber 2007). On the other hand, evidence has been presented that household 
social ties with neighbors, which can be regarded as a kind of social capital, 
generate benefits for residents2. This benefit disappears if a household moves, 
reinforcing low residential mobility (Kan 2007). This indicates that individual 
decision making is influenced by the degree of accumulated social capital among 
neighbors. It follows from arguments such as those above that under 
circumstances where a larger amount of social capital is formed, a person is less 
likely to move and hence is more inclined to invest in social capital.  
 Not only an individual‟s features but also neighbor characteristics are 
expected to have a critical effect on individual behavior concerning individual 
investment in social capital3. Few researchers, with the exception of DiPasquale 
                                                   
1 Some works have criticized the ambiguity of the definition of social capital and 
pointed out drawbacks in measurement (e.g., Paldam 2000; Durlauf 2002a, 
2002b). 
2 Social network considered as social capital appears to make a contribution to 
technological diffusion among colleagues (Yamamura 2008a). 
3 It is found that people are less inclined to cooperate to resolve collective 
problems in more heterogeneous communities (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; 
Yamamura 2008b). 
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and Glaeser (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999), attempt to investigate the effects of 
homeownership and the length of residence on individual investment in social 
capital. Furthermore, although investment in social capital appears affected by 
socio-economic conditions, investigations have not been conducted outside of 
western countries. How social capital is accumulated in countries outside the 
west needs to be investigated to determine the extent to which socio-economic 
conditions influence results. This paper uses individual level data from Japan to 
investigate not only the effects of individual homeownership and the length of 
residence, but also those of neighbors, and then compares the former with the 
latter.  
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows: In section 2, a 
simple theoretical model is presented. Section 3 describes data, the method of 
analysis and the estimation strategies. The results of the estimations and their 
interpretation are provided in section 4. The final section offers concluding 
remarks. 
 
Basic model 
In this paper, social capital is considered to be formed through aggregated 
individual investment for social activities such as involvement in a neighborhood 
association. Furthermore, this paper is based on the idea that rational behavior 
taken by an individual leads to investment in social capital (Glaeser et al., 2002)4.  
In the model, individual social capital is represented as the stock of a variable, 
S . Each individual gets a per-period utility flow of  ,HSR  where  HR  is a 
differentiable function with neighbor (or individual) immobility.   HSR  
captures market returns. It is known that an interpersonal social network and 
trust are formed through long-term interactions among people, resulting in a 
decrease in transaction cost (Hayami, 2001). It seems reasonably argued that the 
lack of population mobility leads to stable and long-term interpersonal 
                                                   
4 Glaeser et al (2002) applies standard optimal investment to analyze the social 
capital formation. 
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relationships. Accordingly, I assume   0' HR .  
The social capital stock follows the dynamic budget constraint, ttt ISS  1  . 
1  represents the depreciation rate. The level of investment in t period, tI , has 
a time cost  tIC , where  C  is increasing and convex. The opportunity cost of 
time is, w , which represents the wage rate if the labor supply is inelastic. 
Individuals discount the future with a discount factor  . Individual lifespan is 
denoted as T. An individual‟s maximization problem can be expressed as: 
   
...
],[max
1
0
,,,,1,0
tISSts
IwCHRS
ttt
tt
T
t
t
III







 
An individual maximizes their objective function, taking H as fixed. The 
first-order condition associated with this investment problem is given by: 
   .
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This first-order condition suggests a comparative statistic result. Social 
capital increases with neighbor (or individual) immobility, H. It follows from this 
result that neighbor (or individual) homeownership and length of residence are 
positively associated with an individuals‟ investment in social capital. However, it 
is unclear whether the effects of neighbor immobility on an individual‟s 
investment are larger than those of individual immobility. To examine this, 
empirical estimations are conducted in the following sections. 
 
Data and Methods 
Data 
This paper used individual level data containing information related to 
areas such as social capital index, years of living at the current address, 
homeownership, demographic (age and sex) and economic (occupation, household 
income) status5. This data was constructed from the Social Policy and Social 
                                                   
5 The data for this secondary analysis, "Social Policy and Social Consciousness 
survey (SPSC), Shogo Takekawa," was provided by the Social Science Japan Data 
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Consciousness (SPSC) survey conducted in all parts of Japan in 2000. Five 
thousand adults (aged 20 years old or older) were invited to participate in a 
survey that utilized stratified two-stage random sampling. The survey eventually 
collected data on 3991 adults, a response rate of 79.8 %6. Sample points were 
divided into 11 areas. In each area, according to their population size, cities and 
towns are divided into 4 groups such as the 13 metropolitan cities, cities with 200 
000 people or greater, cities with 100 000 people or greater, and towns and 
villages. Therefore, 4 population groups exist within each of the 11 areas. Hence, 
area-population groups can be divided into 44, which are defined as local groups 
in this paper. As shown later, variables to capture neighbor characteristics are 
calculated in accord with these local groupings.7. 
Table 1 includes variable definitions and basic statistics. Following the 
discussion in Putnam (2000), the degree of civic engagement is considered as 
investment for social capital in this research. Thus, social capital was measured 
using the question “Are you actively involved in the activity of a neighborhood 
association?” Responses ran from 0 (not at all) to 3 ( Yes, actively involved ). 
Homeowner was measured using the question “What is your type of residence?”. 
The responses were “I own my home”, “I reside in a home owned by a parent” and 
“others”. For the basic estimation, I defined homeownership as being a home 
owned by individuals or their parents.  
 
Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
I see from Table 2 (1) that a homeowner is significantly more likely to invest in 
social capital. Table 2 (2) shows that a person living at their current address 
longer than 20 years is more inclined to invest in social capital. These results are 
                                                                                                                                                              
Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of 
Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
6 Respondents did not respond to all questions and therefore 3075samples were 
used for regression estimations. 
7 According to the data used in this research, 4 areas do not contain metropolitan 
cities. Thus, only 40 local groups exist in the data. 
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in line with the evidence provided by earlier report that barriers to mobility give 
individuals an incentive to investment in social capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser 
1999; Hilber 2007).    
I now explore how the local circumstance of individuals, captured by neighbor 
homeownership and length of residence, are related to an individuals‟ investment 
in social capital. Following the model used by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), the 
estimated function takes the following form: 
SC im= 0  + 1 HOME im+ 2LIVE20im +3LIVE10im +4AVHOMEim 
+5AVLIVE20im+6AVLIVE10im+7CHILDim+8MARRIim+9DIVm+10AGEim+11
INCOMEim+12UNIVim+13MALEim+em+ uim , 
where SC im represents the dependent variable in resident i, and area m. ‟s 
represents regression parameters. em represents unobservable area specific 
effects that are controlled by dummy variables. uim represents the error term. In 
addition to the OLS model, the Ordered Probit model is also employed since the 
dependent variable is qualitative and ranges from 0 to 3. 
Individual homeownership dummy, HOME, is used to capture the homeowner 
effect. If a homeowner tends to invest in social capital, the anticipated sign of 
HOME is positive. As discussed by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), HOME is 
possibly correlated with unmeasured factors included in uim. HOME is thus 
thought to be an endogenous variable, resulting in estimation bias8. A person 
residing in a home owned by a parent is less likely to suffer endogenous bias since 
it is exogenously determined whether a parent is a homeowner or not. Therefore, 
I omit the samples where an individual is the homeowner and newly define the 
dummy variable, which takes 1 if one‟s parent is the homeowner, otherwise 0, as 
                                                   
8 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) considered the average group homeownership 
rate as an exogenous variable and used it as an instrument variable. Similar 
results are obtained if the same estimation method is employed using the data 
used for this research, although estimation results are not reported. I regard such 
a group average variable as more useful for capturing the neighborhood effect as 
an independent variable. 
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HOME, to conduct alternative estimations aiming to alleviate endogenous bias9. 
To capture the effect of length of residence, individual long resident dummies 
such as LIVE20 and LIVE 10 are used. According to Kan (2007), length of 
residence can be considered as the degree of integration into the neighborhood. 
People integrated into the neighborhood are thought to be inclined to invest in 
social capital since the return from the investment is expected to be large. Hence, 
coefficients of LIVE20 and LIVE10 are predicted to take the positive signs. What 
is more, longer time residents are more inclined to invest in social capital so that 
the magnitude of LIVE20 is anticipated to be larger than LIVE10.  
The rate of neighborhood homeownership can be regarded as the degree of local 
population immobility, since homeownership creates a barrier to mobility. As a 
consequence, homeowners have a tendency to invest in social capital (DiPasquale 
and Glaeser 1999). By definition, the rate of long-time residence is also thought to 
reflect local population immobility. Long-time residents are likely to have 
long-term relationships with neighbors since people will move if they fail to 
construct good relationships with their neighbors 10 . Hence, neighborhood 
homeownership and length of residence are thought to be proxies for accumulated 
social capital. Neighborhood homeownership and length of residence are 
measured by group average HOME rate (AVHOME) and group average LIVE20 
and LIVE10 rates (AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10) within a local group, respectively. 
To exclude an individual i‟ s effect from i‟ s local group average, i‟ s sample is 
                                                   
9 Sample size is 3075 when all samples are used. Among these, samples are 2349 
when HOME takes 1. So, the homeownership rate is 76% in all samples. More 
precisely, 2349 homeownerships are made up of 1878 individual homeownerships 
and 471 of parent ownership. Therefore, the sample size used in the alternative 
estimations becomes 1197 since the individual homeownership samples are 
omitted. In this case, the parent homeownership rate becomes 39%. 
10 People would suffer from ostracism if they infringe social norms considered as 
local rules, leading to people following norms (Hayami 2001). Such a „community 
mechanism‟ seems to be, to a certain extent, effective even in modern Japanese 
society (Yamamura 2008c). 
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omitted from the samples when local average values are calculated. These 
variables would take positive signs if ample social capital within a community 
where a person resides encourages a person to invest in social capital. 
People with children are likely to have opportunities to interact with other 
parents through PTA meetings and various events for children held by 
community associations, leading the sign for CHILD to become positive. Several 
control variables are also included to capture individual characteristics: marital 
status, age, male‟s dummy, and university graduation dummy. 
 
Estimation Results and their Interpretation 
Tables 3 and A1 presented in the Appendix report results using all samples.  
Alternative estimation results are presented in Tables 4 and A2, where I omit 
samples where a person is the homeowner and use the dummy variable, which 
takes 1 if a parent is the homeowner, otherwise it takes 0, as HOME. If 
homeownership creates a barrier to mobility, the length of residence is correlated 
with homeownership, resulting in multicollinearlity. Therefore, in Tables 3, 4, A1, 
and A2, column (3) reports results when AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10 are excluded, 
and column (4) results when AVHOME is excluded to compare the full model in 
column(2) with columns(3) and (4). 
I now discuss Table 3 that shows the results of OLS estimations. Looking at the 
first row shows that HOME has positive signs in all estimations, and is 
statistically significant at the 1 % level.  This implies that a homeowner is more 
likely to invest in social capital, which is consistent with DiPasquale and Glaeser 
(1999). As anticipated, LIVE20 and LIVE10 yield positive signs in all estimations 
although LIVE10 is not statistically significant. As anticipated, the magnitude of 
LIVE20 is obviously larger than that of LIVE10. It follows from this that a barrier 
to mobility caused by individual characteristics enhances social capital 
investment. With respect to neighbor effects captured by AVHOME, AVLIVE20, 
and AVLIVE10, AVHOME produces significant positive signs in columns (2) and 
(3). It is also interesting to observe that the values of AVHOME are about 4 times 
larger than those of HOME, which implies that neighbor homeownership makes a 
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greater contribution to increases in social capital formation than does individual 
homeownership.  AVLIVE20 and AVLIVE10 show positive signs, despite being 
statistically insignificant in column (2). If AVHOME is excluded, as exhibited in 
column (4), both continue to yield positive signs and AVLIVE20 becomes 
statistically significant at the 1 % level. Consistent with the prediction, 
AVLIVE20 is larger than ALIVE10. What is more, values of AVLIVE20 and 
AVLIVE10 are clearly larger than LIVE20 and LIVE10. Therefore, the neighbor 
length of residence effect is thought to be larger than the individual‟s length of 
residence effect. CHILD shows the anticipated positive sign and is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level, suggesting parents are more likely to being integrated 
into the community, such as through involvement with the PTA. Most of the 
results concerning other variables, with the exception of UNIV which takes 
negative signs, are consistent with existing work (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). 
 I now turn to the results of Table 4 where samples are restricted. I concentrate 
attention on homeownership and length of residence. In all estimations, HOME 
and LIVE20 continue to exhibit significant positive signs although LIVE10 
becomes negative.  When I compare these with the full sample estimations seen 
in Table 3, the values of HOME are slightly over 0.20 and are almost at the same 
level as HOME shown in Table 3. Those of LIVE20 are 0.12, larger than those of 
LIVE20 in Table 3. Overall, the results of individual homeownership and length 
of residence are robust when the endogenous bias of HOME is controlled for. As 
for AVHOME, it produces the expected positive signs and is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level. Values of AVHOME are approximately 1, almost the 
same as those of AVHOME in Table 3. Both ALIVE20 and ALIVE10 take positive 
signs and ALIVE20 in column (4) is statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
Compared with the full sample estimations in Table 3, values of AVLIVE 20 are 
almost the same as in Table 3, while values of AVLIVE10 show 0.60, larger than 
ALIVE10 in Table 3. Considering what has been observed overall in Tables 3 and , 
the effects of neighbor homeownership and length of residence are distinctly 
larger than those of an individual‟s homeownership effects, and continue to be 
held after alleviating the endogenous bias of individual homeownership. I can 
10 
 
derive the argument from this that individuals are inclined to invest in social 
capital under circumstances where their community is a tightly knitted one based 
on long-term social ties with neighbors. In other words, a large amount of 
accumulated social capital enhances an individual‟s investment in social capital. 
The evidence from the U.S. provided by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) did not 
find that the local homeownership rate significantly affects social capital 
investment, while their model predicts that local homeownership rates will affect 
investment in social capital. Thus the evidence from the U.S is contrary to that 
from Japan provided by this research. One reason why the neighbor effect is 
different between U.S. and Japan might be that U.S is racially more 
heterogeneous and so the neighborhood effect is decreased.  
As shown in the APPENDIX, the results of Ordered Probit estimations shown 
in Tables A1 and A2 correspond to those of the OLS estimations in Tables 3 and 4, 
respectively. The results obtained by Ordered Probit estimations are similar to 
the OLS estimations, implying that the results of OLS are robust to alternative 
estimations and therefore strongly support the argument noted above. 
 
Conclusions 
How and the extent to which the incentive to invest in social capital increases 
when individuals own their home has been well investigated. However, little is 
known about the effects of a neighbor‟s homeownership on individual investment 
in social capital. This paper aims to explore how the circumstances of where a 
person resides are related to the degree of their own investment in social capital 
using data of the 3 075 adult participants in the 2000 Social Policy and Social 
Consciousness (SPSC) survey. Controlling for unobserved area-specific fixed 
effects and various individual characteristics, I found;  
(1) Not only that an individual‟s homeownership and length of residence are 
positively related to their investment in social capital, but also that the rates of 
homeownership and long-time residence in a locality increase an individual‟s 
investments in social capital.  
(2) The effect of local neighbor homeownership and length of residence are 
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remarkably larger than that of an individual‟s homeownership.  
Empirical study provided evidence that the effect of a neighborhood‟s 
immobility on social capital formation is larger than those of an individual‟s when 
a person makes a decision regarding investment. What came out most clearly 
from this investigation was that not only an individual„s characteristics but also 
positive externality stemming from neighborhood immobility have crucial roles in 
social capital formation and thus should be considered in any study related to 
social capital.  
The endogenous problem of homeownership appears to cause estimation bias 
but was not sufficiently controlled in this study. Therefore, suitable instruments 
need to be determined and then two-stage estimation conducted.  Further, this 
study was limited to Japan and the findings provided thus far cannot be easily 
generalized. The findings of this study are not fully congruent with the findings 
from the U.S. (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). To better verify the generality of 
the arguments presented here, study comparing results from other countries with 
different socio-cultural backgrounds needs to be conducted using larger sample 
sizes. These are issues remaining to be addressed in future studies. 
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TABLE 1 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
 
Note:  a 10 Million yen   
 
 
Variables 
 
Definition Mean Max Min 
SC The degree of involvement in the activities of a 
neighborhood association runs from 0 (not at 
all) to 3 (actively involved).  
1.35 3 0 
HOME 
 
Takes 1 if one is a homeowner, otherwise takes 
0. 
 
0.76 1 0 
LIVE20 Takes 1 if a person has lived at their current 
address for longer than 20 years, otherwise 
takes 0. 
0.62 1 0 
LIVE10 Takes 1 if a person has lived at their current 
address for between 10 and 20 years, otherwise 
takes 0. 
0.17 1 0 
AVHOME Average value of HOME within an area. (Total 
HOME in the locality minus own 
HOME)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.76 0.98 0.43 
AVLIVE20 Average value of LIVE20 within an area. (Total 
LIVE20 in the locality minus own 
LIVE20)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.61 0.89 0.26 
AVLIVE10 Average value of LIVE10 within an area. (Total 
LIVE10 in the locality minus own 
LIVE10)/(Number of samples minus 1) 
0.17 0.26 0.04 
CHILD 
 
Takes 1 if a person has child, otherwise takes 0.  0.77 1 0 
MARRI Takes 1 if one has a spouse, otherwise takes 0. 
 
 0.75 1 0 
DIV Takes 1 if one experienced divorce, otherwise 
takes 0. 
 
0.03 1 0 
AGE Ages 
 
49 96 20 
INCOME Household income a 
 
0.65 0.23 0 
UNIV Takes 1 if one graduated from university, 
otherwise takes 0. 
 0.15 1 0 
MALE Takes 1 if one is male, otherwise takes 0. 
 
0.47 1 0 
15 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2  
Social capital and characteristics of residents. 
(1) Comparison of social capital between homeowner and non-homeowner. 
 Homeowner Non-homeowner t-value 
SC 1.46 1.01 12.6 ** 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level. 
 
(2) Comparison of social capital between people living at their current address for 
longer than 20 years and others. 
 Longer than 20 
years 
Others t-value 
SC 1.48 1.15 10.4 ** 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level. 
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of investment for social capital: All samples (OLS model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.24** 
(5.91) 
0.19** 
(4.72) 
0.19** 
(4.72) 
0.22** 
(5.39) 
LIVE20 0.17** 
(3.80) 
0.17** 
(3.71) 
0.17** 
(3.77) 
0.16** 
(3.61) 
LIVE10 0.01 
(0.19) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.32) 
0.007 
(0.15) 
AVHOME 
 
 0.91** 
(4.44) 
1.01** 
(6.18) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.28 
(0.93) 
 1.03** 
(3.94) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.22 
(0.48) 
 0.33 
(0.70) 
CHILD 
 
0.31** 
(5.69) 
0.30** 
(5.59) 
0.30** 
(5.59) 
0.31** 
(5.66) 
MARRI 0.20** 
(3.69) 
0.19** 
(3.60) 
0.19** 
(3.59) 
0.20** 
(3.72) 
DIV -0.09 
(-0.95) 
-0.08 
(-0.87) 
-0.08 
(-0.89) 
-0.08 
(-0.87) 
AGE 
 
0.007** 
(6.10) 
0.008** 
(6.25) 
0.008** 
(6.27) 
0.007** 
(6.12) 
INCOME 
 
-0.02 
(-0.49) 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.41) 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
UNIV 
 
-0.08* 
(-1.78) 
-0.06 
(-1.42) 
-0.06 
(-1.42) 
-0.07 
(-1.60) 
MALE 
 
-0.01 
(-0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.57) 
-0.01 
(-0.57) 
-0.01 
(-0.54) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Adj R- square 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 
Sample size 3075 3075 3075 3075 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). A constant term is included 
when an estimation was conducted but its result is not reported to save space. * 
and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
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TABLE 4 
Determinants of investment for social capital: Living in home owned by parents 
(OLS model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.26** 
(4.24) 
0.21** 
(3.31) 
0.20** 
(3.30) 
0.23** 
(3.81) 
LIVE20 0.12* 
(1.94) 
0.12* 
(1.91) 
0.12* 
(1.94) 
0.12* 
(1.85) 
LIVE10 -0.03 
(-0.46) 
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
-0.02 
(-0.37) 
-0.03 
(-0.43) 
AVHOME 
 
 0.89** 
(2.75) 
0.98** 
(3.68) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.35 
(0.81) 
 0.97** 
(2.57) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.60 
(0.84) 
 0.60 
(0.84) 
CHILD 
 
0.35** 
(4.25) 
0.35** 
(4.21) 
0.35** 
(4.22) 
0.35** 
(4.25) 
MARRI 0.16* 
(1.95) 
0.15* 
(1.84) 
0.15* 
(1.81) 
0.16* 
(1.93) 
DIV -0.009 
(-0.07) 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
-0.003 
(-0.03) 
AGE 
 
0.007** 
(3.35) 
0.006** 
(3.29) 
0.007** 
(3.31) 
0.006** 
(3.28) 
INCOME 
 
-0.06 
(-0.91) 
-0.07 
(-1.01) 
-0.07 
(-1.01) 
-0.06 
(-0.93) 
UNIV 
 
-0.04 
(-0.56) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
-0.03 
(-0.42) 
MALE 
 
0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Adj R- square 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Sample size 1197 1197 1197 1197 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). A constant term is included 
when an estimation was conducted but its result is not reported to save space. * 
and ** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
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TABLE A1 
Determinants of investment for social capital (Ordered Probit 
model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.30** 
(5.89) 
0.24** 
(4.70) 
0.24** 
(4.70) 
0.27** 
(5.37) 
LIVE20 0.21** 
(3.74) 
0.20** 
(3.66) 
0.21** 
(3.71) 
0.20** 
(3.55) 
LIVE10 0.01 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.31) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
AVHOME 
 
 1.11** 
(4.41) 
1.24** 
(6.11) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.35 
(0.91) 
 1.26** 
(3.90) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.29 
(0.50) 
 0.41 
(0.73) 
CHILD 
 
0.39** 
(5.74) 
0.38** 
(5.64) 
0.38** 
(5.63) 
0.38** 
(5.71) 
MARRI 0.25** 
(3.76) 
0.24** 
(3.68) 
0.24** 
(3.66) 
0.25** 
(3.80) 
DIV -0.10 
(-0.85) 
-0.09 
(-0.76) 
-0.09 
(-0.78) 
-0.09 
(-0.77) 
AGE 
 
0.009** 
(6.10) 
0.009** 
(6.26) 
0.009** 
(6.28) 
0.009** 
(6.12) 
INCOME 
 
-0.02 
(-0.53) 
-0.02 
(-0.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.44) 
-0.02 
(-0.42) 
UNIV 
 
-0.09* 
(-1.66) 
-0.07 
(-1.31) 
-0.07 
(-1.32) 
-0.08 
(-1.48) 
MALE 
 
-0.01 
(-0.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.55) 
-0.02 
(-0.54) 
-0.02 
(-0.52) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- 
square 
0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Sample size 3075 3075 3075 3075 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). * and ** indicate significance 
at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
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TABLE A2  
Determinants of investment for social capital: Living in home owned by parents 
(Ordered Probit model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
HOME 
 
0.32** 
(4.23) 
0.26** 
(3.30) 
0.26** 
(3.29) 
0.29** 
(3.79) 
LIVE20 0.15* 
(1.86) 
0.15* 
(1.85) 
0.15* 
(1.86) 
0.14* 
(1.78) 
LIVE10 -0.05 
(-0.57) 
-0.04 
(-0.47) 
-0.04 
(-0.46) 
-0.05 
(-0.54) 
AVHOME 
 
 1.11** 
(2.76) 
1.21** 
(3.63) 
 
AVLIVE20 
 
 0.40 
(0.73) 
 1.17** 
(2.47) 
AVLIVE10 
 
 0.72 
(0.80) 
 0.70 
(0.79) 
CHILD 
 
0.44** 
(4.27) 
0.44** 
(4.23) 
0.44** 
(4.24) 
0.44** 
(4.27) 
MARRI 0.20* 
(2.00) 
0.19* 
(1.89) 
0.19* 
(1.85) 
0.20* 
(1.99) 
DIV -0.004 
(-0.03) 
-0.005 
(-0.03) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
AGE 
 
0.008** 
(3.29) 
0.008** 
(3.25) 
0.008** 
(3.27) 
0.008** 
(3.22) 
INCOME 
 
-0.09 
(-1.00) 
-0.10 
(-1.08) 
-0.10 
(-1.09) 
-0.09 
(-1.02) 
UNIV 
 
-0.03 
(-0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.30) 
MALE 
 
0.01 
(0.21) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
0.005 
(0.08) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
Area a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- 
square 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Sample size 1197 1197 1197 1197 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** indicate significance at 5 
and 1 per cent levels, respectively (one-sided tests). * and ** indicate significance 
at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 a.YES means that dummy variables are included to control for area specific 
effects. 
 
 
 
